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complete markets with altruism to family risk-sharing. We use a
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the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to discriminate between the
four models. Our testing procedure is designed to deal with the
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decisively rejected, while we fail to reject altruism and hence
family risk-sharing for a subset of families.
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and NBER1. INTRODUCTION
An infinitely-lived representative agent is the central economic actor
in a good many modern macroeconomic analyses. The justification for such an
egent rests on complete markets and pure intergenerational altruism. With
pure altruism, the family acts as a single immortal decision making agent.
With complete markets, efficient risk-sharing leads heterogeneoua agents to
act in a manner equivalent to that of a aingle representative agent.1 This
paper uses micro data to test these two distinct hypothesis motivating the
representative agent assumption.
If, as it turns out, the joint hypotheais of complete markets and pure
altruism (our model a) fails empirically, we would like to know which compon-
ent of the joint hypotheais is responsible for the failure.Therefore we
also test pure altruism (model b) and complete markets (model c) separately.
They are, in turn, special casea of an arguably more credible model, family
risk-sharing (our model d), which posits that efficient risk-sharing implied
by complete markets takes place within, but not necesssrily between, feisili-
es.Since family risk-sharing occurs automatically if family members are
altruistically linked, the four models of consumption we test are partially
nested, as shown in Figure 1.
It is well known that complete markets imply a very specific factor
structure for the log marginal utility.2 We will show that each of the other
three models of consumption also has its own factor structure. Since each
factor structure can be translated into a set of restrictions on the same
covsrisnce matrix between consumption and endowments, we can teat the four
1See, e.g., Hansen and Sargent (1990) for an explicit statement of the
aggregation procedure.
2See, e.g., Altug end Miller (1990).
-I-models sequentially using the same sample, starting with family risk-sharing
and proceeding to the joint hypothesis of complete markets and altruism.
Two of the four models axamined in this paper have been tested, indepen-
dently from each other, by several researchers. A particular linear combina-
tion of the covariance restrictions implied by complete markets amounts to
the zero restriction on the contemporaneous income growth coefficient in a
cross-section regression of consumption growth. This has been tested exten-
sively in the literature.Recent tests of complete markets using various
micro data sets on households includes Abel and Icotlikoff (1988), Cochrane
(1989), Mace (1989), and Townsend (l989). Altug and Miller (1990) examined
covarisnce among food consumption, leisure and wages and found no evidence
sgainst complete markets.The only available consumption-based test of
altruism using micro data to our knowledge is in Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotli-
koff (1989), who tested a particular linear combination of the covariance
restriction implied by altruism.4'5
The data to be used in this paper come from the Panel Study of Income
Dynsmics which includes not only households originally sampled but also their
3As argued in Hmymshi (1987), all papers that have regressed the change in
consumption against current and/or lagged income changes (see, e.g, Altonji
and Siow (1987)) have tested efficient risk-sharing implicitly. Abel and
Kotlikoff (1988) derived the regression from altruism, but the restriction
tested is really an implication of complete markets.
4There is a strand of literature that tests for the existence of some
altruism using data on wealth. See, e.g., Hurd (1989).
5Another model of consumption that figures prominently in the literature is
self insurance, which delivers the well-known martingale property of the
marginal utility. However, as first pointed out by Chamberlain (1984), this
cannot be tested in a short panel unless one is willing to make a very speci-
fic assumption about how endowment depends on the state of the world. Avail-
able tests of self insurance (see Hayashi (1987) for a aurvey) require that
endowment be the sum of an economy-wide and an idiosyncratic components. But
then it is not clear why households do not share idiosyncratic risk. Previ-
ous tests of complete markets as well as our covariance-based test do not
make any assumption about the endowment process.
-2-split-offs, independent households headed by their children.We define a
family to be a parent household plus its split-offs. The factor structures
for the four models of consumption imply testable restrictions on the covari.
ance matrix in consumption and endowment between member households of the
family.Execution of the covariance-based test in the sample of families,
however, requires a resolution of several difficulties. First, the composi-
tion of the family varies from one family to another, requiring us to adapt
the test to each family type. Second, since the sample observation is "part-
ial" in that it does not necessarily include all the member households of the
family, our test has to take into account not only possible sample selection
bias but also uncertainty due to the fact that the family's true type cannot
be determined from data. Third, since the marginal utility is not directly
observable, it has to be estimated. The second half of the paper is devoted
to a resolution of these and other difficulties.
The contents of the paper are as follows.Section 2 contains an over-
view of our covariance-based test.In section 3, we formally derive the
factor structure of the marginal utility from household optimization.This
section generalizes the standard model of pure altruism to incorporate uncer-
tainty. Section 4 shows how to translate the factor structure into a set of
covariance restrictions for each family type. Sections 5 provides a solution
of the difficulties arising from the partial nature of the sample. Section 6
shows how to broaden the definition of the family type so that the proposed
solution is feasible given our limited data. Section 7 describes and justi-
fies our two-step procedure, which consists of regressing consumption and
endowment on household characteristics (including leisure) and then calculat-
ing covariances using regression residuals. The sample is briefly described
in section 8. Section- 9 reports our results.
-3-2. AN OVERVIEW
To see the main idea of the paper, consider thefollowingsimple situa-
tion. Take a sample of N families, each consisting of a parent household
indexed by k —0and its split-off (an independent household headed by the
child of the parent household) indexed by k —1,for three years. 1985, 86
and 87. Let be the log consumption and the log endowment for
household k (—0,1)of family i in year t (—85,86,87).The observation
provided by the i-th family is a 12-dimensional vector —(c,y)where ci
—(c1085c1086.c087.c185cj186.c1187)and y is defined similarly.
The instantaneous utility function is the power function C1°/(l-p). If
stands for measurement error in consumption, then (-p1 times) the log
marginal utility (8) is related to the log consumption (c) as:
(2.1) Cjkt —8ikt+ #ikt for k —0,1;t —85,86,87.
Assume the measurement error is uncorrelated in cross-section with endowment:
(2.2) Cov(jk,yj) —0for all k,t (—0,1);t,s (—85,86,87).
The well.known implication of complete markets (our model (c) in Figure
1) is efficient risk-sharing, namely that the change in the log marginal
utility is common to all households. Thus by (2.1) consumption growth diff-
ers across households only because of measurement error.Since measurement
error is uncorrelated with endowment by (2.2), we have:
Cov(Acik86,yiS) —0,Cov(Ac87,y) —0for all k,,s,
or
(2.3) Cov(cjkgs,yjt) —Cov(cik86'iL —Cov(cik87,yjfS)
for all k,t,s,
where Cikt —cik.cikt-l is the consumption growth rate from year t-l to t.
This is a set of equality restrictions on the 6x6 cross covariance matrix
Cov(cik,yi) (k,t —0,1;t,s —85,86,87),which is displayed in Table 1(i).
-4-A weaker form of complete markets is family risk-sharing (our model
(d)), which is that efficient risk-sharing occurs within, but not necessarily
between, families. Then the change in log marginal utility differs between
the parent household and the split-off only because of measurement error
which is uncorrelated with endowment. Thus:
(2.4) Cov(cjü_Acji,yj5) — 0 for all 1, t (— 86,87), s (— 85.86,87),
which is a set of restrictions, not shown here but weaker than that in Table
1(1), on the 6x6 covariance matrix.
Nov suppose that the parent household and the split-off are altruistica-
lly linked (our model (b)).An extreme version of altruism (which will be
somewhat relaxed later on) is that the level of marginal utility is equalized
within the family.Consumption differs within the family only because of
measurement error which is uncorrelated with endowment. Thus:
(2.5) Cov(cjo.cj1t.yj6) — 0for all Its.
The implied restrictions on the cross covariance matrix are displayed in
Table 1(u). As is clear from comparing (2.5) with (2.4), altruism (model
(b)) is stronger than family risk-sharing (model (d)). The joint hypothesis
of complete markets and altruism (our model (a)) combines restrictions (2.3)
and (2.5).
We have thus translated into the set of covariance restrictions the four
partially nested models of consumption shown in Figure 1. The implied covar-
iance restrictions are all linear and can easily be jointly tested. We
emphasize that our covariance-based test of the four models requires neither
assumptions about the endowment process nor data on Arrow-Debreu prices.
The 1987 tape release of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
provide a sample of 192 families, each having one parent household and only
-5-one split-off. There are two consumption components available in the PSID:
food expenditure and housing consumption (actual and isputed rent). Figure
2A(i) is a plot of (cioss+c1igs+cio86+ci1s&+cio87+c187v6, the log
food expenditure averaged over family members and over time, against the
corresponding log average household endowment (labor income).6 We verify
that there is a highly significant correlation between food expenditure and
endowment (the regression coefficient is 0.25 with a t value of 5.1 and of
0.12). The corresponding plot for housing consumption is in Figure 28(i).
The regression coefficient is 0.61 with a t of 6.5 and It2 of 0.18.
To visually examine the impact of risk-sharing within families, consider
the following linear combination of the set of covariance restrictions (2.4):
cov(cio87-ci085-ci187-ci185.yi087-yi085-yi187y185) —0.
This is a covariance in differential 2-year changes.Figure 2A(ii) (Figure
28(u)) is a plot of this covariance for food (housing). The strong associ-
ation apparent in Panel (i) mostly disappears, particularly for food, On the
other hand, altruism does not hold in the data. To see this visually, consi-
der the difference in time averages:
Cov(Ecto/3cii/3, Yo/3-XYi1/3) 0,
which is a linear combination of (2.5). That this restriction does not hold
is clear from Figure 2A(iii) and 28(iii).
6Conaumption (c) and endowment (y) are residuals from regressing c and y on
household characteristics. For more details, see section 9.
-6-3. FOUR MODELS OF CONSUMPTION
This section derives the factor structure of the marginal utility for
the four models of consumption displayed in Table II. Readers not interested
in the derivation can skip this section without losing continuity.
We begin by describing aspects of the economic environment that pertain
to the properties of consumption we examine. Since households are finitely-
lived, the set of existing households varies across states of the world. We
index households that existed in some particular past state by "i'.These
households may give birth to spl.Lt-offs, separate households headed by their
children that exist in some states of the world. The k-th split-off of
household i is indexed by "ik. To emphasize that household i is a parent
household, we index it by "i00.A family is a collection of households
consisting of a parent household and its split-offs. Whether it is signifi-
cant that the household belongs to a particular family depends on the model
we will consider below. For each household ilc, there is a set Aik of states
in which the household is alive, which consists of a unique birth state (eik)
and a set of states that follow the birth state. The household's consumption
in state e in date t is a scelar Cik(e) defined over Aik. (Extending the
analysis to the multi-commodity case is atraightforwsrd.) Figure 3 gives an
illustration of our notation. Household iO exists in state a. It has five
(potential) split-offs (k —1,2,..,5).Split-offs (k's) that are alive in
each state are listed in braces in the figure. Thus, for example, the birth
state for k —1is state b, and Aik for k —1is (b,c,d).7
7This example makes it clear that we distinguish between households with
different birth states even if their utility function and the endowment
process conditional on the birth state may be the same. We chose this conv-
ention, found in Wright (1987), because the notation (particularly (3.8) and
(3.9) below) is simpler.
-7-Complete Markets with Selfish Households
We first consider the well-known case of complete markets with selfish
households.The household's objective is to maximize its expected lifetime
utility:
(3.1) Uik —E w(ele.k)uik(Cik(e);e)
e cA.t ik
where w(eteik) is the probability of e conditional on eik.(If there is
discounting, it is embedded in the dependence of uik on er.) Let P(eIe) be
the price at state e of a claim to one unit of the good payable in state et.





where Aik is the Lagrange multiplier for ik's lifetime budget constraint.
Taking the log of the first-order condition (3.2) and using the arbitrage





(3.4) 0 kt —log 3G.ik





That is, as noted moat recently by Townsend (1989) end Altug and Miller
(1990), the log marginal utility for household ik has a simple factor struc-
ture, consisting of two "effects" or factors, one representing household ik's
endowment or lifetime resources 'ik and the other en undiversifiable aggrega-
te shock p(e)
-8-Family Risk-Sharing between Selfish Households
Efficient risk-sharing between households within families is equivalent
to the situation in which contingency claims are traded within but not neces-
sarily between families.The security prices can differ across families.
The firat.order condition is now
(3.7) #ik(e) — +
Notethe difference from (3.3): the p factor can differ across i.
Altruism
The alternative specification of preferences is that households within
families are altruistically linked.Our specification of altruism is that
household iO's objective function is defined over its own consumption and
that of ita offspring:
(3.8) —X w(eIej0)fl0Ui
where Ui is defined in (3.1), and the summation is over household iO and all
its potential offspring m. The summation can be rewritten as:
(3.9)
Xm(etleio)[i(et)iomimtmt
where the summation E is over all states of the world emanating from e
at iO
and Ei(e) is the set of offspring (including the parent household) that
exist in state e.
If the utility weight 0iOm satisfies
(3.10) 0iOm —0iOk0ikmwith 0ioo —1,
then can be rewritten recursively as
(3.11) —U0
+,r(e.kleio)niokvik
-9-where the summation now is over all potential split-offa (i.e., direct off-
apring) of household iO and where Vik is defined by (3.8) with "0" replaced
by "k'. Therefore the collection of utility functions Vik is intergeneratio-
nally consisrenr in the sense that each generation views its children's
utility as a sufficient statistic fot all its offspring's actions. Thia of
course is a generalization to uncertainty of the Barro dynasty utility.
Now consider the problem of maximizing household i0's objective function
(3.8). The maximization is over the actions by itself and all its offspring
subject to a sequence of lifetime budget constraints, each pertaining to an
offspring, under complete markets. Since the prefetencea are interganeratlo-
nally consistent, the solution will be self-enforcing in that future off-
spring, each acting to maximize its own objective Vi. end up choosing the
same action prescribed by the parent household.8
If the non-negarivity constraint on bequests is not binding for the k-tb
split-off,9 the first-order condition for maximization of (3.8) or (3.9) with





where is the Lagrange multiplier for the family's combined single budget
constraint. Taking logs of both sides of (3.12) we obtain
(3.13) eik(e) —++ p()
5The solution has this self-enforcing property even if the sequence of life-
time budget constraints are not integrated due to binding nonnegativity
constraints.Streufert (1989) shows, for the case of certainty, that the
solution is the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in Narkov strategies
in a game played by generations (with or without the non-negativity constrai-
nt).
5We will identify such split-offa in the data from information on the amount
of expected bequests.




If complete markets do not necessarily exist, the p factor can depend on the
family, so that the factor structure becomes:
(3.16) Oik(et) —Ai+ 'ik + pi(e).
In order for this model of altruism to be empirically distinguishable
from non-altruistic models of consumption, the utility weight wik must satis-
fy two requirements. First, it cannot depend on the endowment process
Y1k(e), eGAjk.1° Consider distinguishing (3.13) from (3.3). The Lagrange
multiplier Aik in (3.3) is a function of the value of ik's endowments,
If the utility weight Wik in (3.13) is allowed to
be a function of the endowment process, then, for any non-altruistic alloca-
tion of consumption Cjk(.) satisfying (3.3), there exists a function wik such
that (3.13) holds for the same allocation. Thus, to make the model of altru-
ism observationally different, the model must be specific about how the
utility weight depends on the endowment process. But since we do not observe
the endowment process (what we observe is a particular realization of the
process for some dates), the only model of altruism empirically distinguisha-
ble from non-altruistic models is one in which the utility weight does not
depend on the endowment process.
The second requirement for the model of altruism to be distinguishable
is more subtle.Define the ax-ante type of a family to be a specification
'°The standard model of altruism seems to be of this type. For example, the
model in Chapter 8 of Becker (1981) apparently assumes that the beneficiary's
income does not affect the altruist's preferences.
-11-indicating which households are alive in which state. Figure 3 actually is
an example of a particular ex-ante type; if there is another family for which
the same figure can be drawn aftet suitably re-labelling k's, then they sre
of the same type. Now suppose that the actual history is, say, (s,e,f) in
Figure 3 and that we have observations on families with one split-off in dste
e and two in date f.There can be many ex-ante family types, not just the
type in the figure, that have one split-off in date e and two in date f. If
the utility weight depends on the family type, what could happen is that the
utility weight appears to be correlated with endowments in the cross-section
of families because certain family types may tend to have lsrger endowments.
The following utility weights satisfy the two requirements:
(3.17) '°ik
where bi(k) is the birth order of k. For example for the family type depict-
ed in Figure 3, b.(l) —b.(3)—1,b.(2) —b.(4)—bi(5)
—2.Under this
assumption the utility weight cannot depend on the number of existing split-
offs, which is actually a desirable property. For, refer back to Figure 3.
The number of splir-offs is one in state e and two in state f.Clearly, if
the utility weight is to depend on the number of split-offs, it must be
state-dependent. For the rest of this paper we assume that (3.17) is part of
our model of altruism."
To summarize, we have derived the factor structure of the log marginal
utility implied by the four models of consumption.They are displayed in
11Assumption (3.17), which assumes that the utility weight is the same across
families if the birth order is controlled for, is a sufficient but not nece-
ssary condition for the two requirements to hold. We could allow the utility
weight to deviate randomly from (3.17) across families in the way specified
in section 4.2 for #.Wedecided to take the more restrictive assumption
(3.17) only because doing so substantially simplifies the exposition in the
rest of the paper.
-12-Table II.In the table and for the rest of the paper, we take as given a
particular history of the state of the world, so that the dependence of any
variable on e can be represented by subscript t. Also, since the split-off
can be uniquely identified by its birth order given the particular history,
hereafter the subscript 'k" will represent the birth order. For model (c),
which is the union of the case of complete markets with selfish households
and model (a) (complete markets with altruism), the factor structure in the
table certainly is true for the case of complete markets with selfish house-
holds (see (3.3)) and is also implied by the factor structure for model (a).
That is, the factor structure displayed for model (c) in the table is an
implication of complete markets with or without altruism. Similarly, the
factor structure for model (d) is an implication of risk-sharing per Se.
-13-4. THE COVARIANCE RESTRICTIONS
In this section, we translate the factor structure of log marginal
utility displayed in Table II into a aet of restrictions on the cross covari-
ance of consumption with endowments between parents and their split-offs.
This task is rather complicated for two reasons.First, the population of
families contains many family types with different household-year combinatio-
ns.So, for example, the covariance of the parent's consumption with the
third split-off's endowment cannot be defined for all families in the popula-
tion. This section addresses this problem. The next section deals with the
second problem, which is that the sample observation on a family does not
necessarily include all member households of the family.
4.1. Sub-population of Families
Consider the set of all U.S. families consisting of (parent) households
that existed in 1968 and their split-offa (if any). For each family i, we
assign Ic —0to the parent household and index its split-offs (if any) by k
(—1,2,..)ordered by birth.We divide the population of families into
sub-populations by the (ex-post) family type, indexed by a, which is the set
of household-year combinations ((k,t)'s). For the setof variables pertai-
ning to households, we define a vector of random variables, defined
over sub-population a of families. For example, the family type a displayed
in Table III has the parent household (k —0)and the first split-off (k —1)
in the first year, joined by the second split-off (k —2)in the second year,
yielding 5 household-year combinations with the associated set a —((0,1),
(1,1), (0,2), (1,2), (2,2)1. For consumption we can define a 5-dimensional
random vector C" —(C,(k,t)ca)
—(C over the
sub -population.
-14-4.2. The Maintained Hypothesis
The two consumption items available from the PSID are food expenditure
and housing consumption (actual and imputed rent). We assume that the utili-
ty from the commodity is additively separable from the rest of the commoditi-
es (except for leisure, see below). The utility from the commodity in year t
for household k in family i of type a is
(4.1) p> 0
where isnow either foodor housing consumption and isa taste
shifterthat affects the utility of the commodity. If is (-p times)
the log marginal utility of the commodity in question, we have:
(4.2) 1og(C) — +1og().
The taste shifter is not directly observable, but there is available a
vector of observed household characteristics, that affects the taste
shifter. Also, let be household ik's endowment. We make the following
assumption on the joint distribution of (1ogx1Y) (k,t)ca, over
sub-population a of families:
(4.3a) —
(4.3b) —°kt
Assumption (4.3a) has three parts, each of which seems a reasonable assumpti-
on. First, the household characteristics of other households within the same
family do not help to predict the taste shifter of the household, given its
owncharacteristics Second, the residual taste shifter, 1ogeZ4a) -
whichwould include things like the average physical body weight of
the individuals within the household, is unrelated to endowments This
-15-is an implication of the basic premise in economics that preference mnd
endowments are unrelated. This is an identifying assumption; once one permi-
ts unrestricted correlation between unobserved taste shifters and endowments,
no theory can deliver any testable restrictions on the correlation between
consumption and endowments. Third, the conditional expectation of the taste
shifter conditional on the household characteristics is linear. This is not
(a) restrictive because our choice of Xikt consists of dummy variables and numer-
ical variables with their squares. Assumption (4.3b), which will be needed
for proving the Proposition in the next section, says that the relationship
between the taste shifter and the characteristics of the household does not
depend on what relatives this household has within the family.




(a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (4.4b)ck —log(C.)
-akxk0ikt —log()
-°kt'ikt
We will include in xc not only the usual demographics (family size, age,
etc.) but also leisure of the head and the spouse, thus allowing for the
possible interaction between consumption and leisure in the utility function.
Measurement error in consumption can be included as part of as long as
it satisfies (4.4a).It can be correlated with true consumption. Also,
endowments can have measurement error that is independent of the taste shift-
er. We must not make any assumption about the relationship between and
(a)(a) (a) because consumption demand, and hence the log marginal
utility depend on and
4.3. The Covsrisnce Restrictions
The residual consumption defined in (4.4b) is not directly observe-
-16-ble unless we know the coefficient vector until section 7, we temporarl-
ly assume that we know Sincewe do not make any assumptions about the
correlation between elements of (k,t)ea,no restriction can be placed
on the consumption covariances Cov(c defined over sub-population a.
However, each of the four models of consumption does imply a set of restric-
tions on the cross covarlance matrix between consumption cjk and any trans-
form of endowment —h(Y)for (k,t),(t,s)Ec.To see this, we note
that
(4.6) Cov(,y) —0,(k,t)eo, (t,s)a,
so that the cross covariance can be written as
(4.7) Cov(c,y) —Cov(8,y),(k,t)Ea, (,s)€a.
Combining this with the factor structure displayed in Table II leads to the
cross covariances in Panel (i) of Table IV. For example, consider the factor
structure for model (a) in Table II.Since UkandPt are constant across
families of all types, only the factor contributes to the covariance of
with An equivalent representation of the covariance restrictions
in Panel (1) is the set of equality restrictions displayed in Panel (ii) of
Table IV. For example, the equality restrictions for the family type which
has k —0,1for three years (t—85,86,87) have already been shown in Table I
for models (b) (altruism) and (c) (complete markets).
-17-5. TESTING COVARIANCE RESTRICTIONS ON "PARTIAL" DATA
If we had observations on all the houaehold-year combinations for each
family in the sample, then testing the restriction displayed in Table IV for
sub-sample a would be straightforward.This is not the case for our data,
where the observation on the family is only partial: some households may not
have been in the sample from the start, and others may be initially in the
sample but have temporarily or permanently dropped out. Therefore, an obser-
ved type r, which is a set of observed household-year combinations, is only a
subset of a. This section describes the problems arising from this partial
nature of the data and how their resolution. Readers not interested in
technical details can skip to the last paragraph of this section.
Let —((log(C),9,log(t),x,y), (k,t)ea), be m random
vector, defined over sub-population a of families, of the variables pertain-
ing to each household in the sample family i. The maintained hypothesis is
the restriction (4.3) on the joint distribution of We have shown in
section 4.3 that, under the maintained hypothesis, the covariance restrictio-
ns in Table IV are immedistely implied by the factor structure for in
Table II.Let be the sub-vector of corresponding to rca.The
partial nature of the data creates two problems. The first is the familiar
selectivity bias: if the selection rule determining which (k,t)'s are observ-
able is not rsndom, the distribution of is not the marginal of 4°,
thatthe covarisnce restrictions may not hold on the (conditional) distribu-
tion of 4).Thesecond problem is less standsrd: we do not know the set of
missing (k,t)'s, so that there is no way of telling which sub-population the
pmrtial observation was drawn from. That is, if the sample family is of type
r, it can come from any sub-population a that includes r. If 411
—
(k,t)ei-, is the sample observation of
-18-observed type r, the distribution of is a mixture of conditional distri-
butions: 12
(5.1) — withprobability p wherep —1.
The question is: does the maintained hypothesis also hold on the distri-
bution of T)?Ifso, then the covariance restrictions immediately follow
from the factor structure. The following proposition says that the answer is
yes if the selection rule is not based on consumption.
PROPOSITION. Suppose the sample selection is such that the set r of house-
hold-year combinations is observed for family i from sub-population a if
where (x0),y0))
— (k,t)Ec. Then the
maintained hypothesis holds on thatis, (4.4) holds for r— a.
PROOF.From (5.1) and the assumed sample selection rule, we have, for any
function g(.) of (r)
(5.2) E[g(T))] -
Nowdefine —log(')
-Oktxiktand let bethe elements
corresponding to (x',y'). Let h(.) be an arbitrary function of
Then .h(xT),y)) is a function of Thus by (5.2),
(5.3)E[.h(xT),yT))3
—
12Ananalogy to a different situation may help to understand the notation
here. Suppose the population consists of singles (a —1)and couples ça—
2).Let be the head's and the wife's income. For singles, 1 > —
y>,
and for couples —(y,y).
The sample selection rule is that
couples are in the sample if y(2) —0.For couples in the sample, all we
observe is the head's income and we do not know whether the head is married
or not. So there is only one observed type, which consists of the household
head only. The sample observation is either y1'> or y.
-19-(This would not be true if °kt' which defines in (4.4b), depended on a.)
The term B[ .h(xc,y')),(xa),yr))Er] on the right hand side of (5.3)
equals (with f(x,y) here being the density of (x,y))
J E[.h(x0),y)x,yjf(x,y)dxdy/Prob((x0),y)ep),
(x,y)Er
which is zero because the integrand is zero by (4.4a). Therefore,
—0for any function h(.) for which the expectation
exists. But since
(5.4) —
itis necessary that —0for all (x),yT)). Q.E.0.
REMARX.Thereader may have noticed that the relationship between a and ris
analogous to that between ex-ante types and a. There are many ex-ante family
types that could have produced an ex-post typea. Thus assuming (4.3) for a
amountsto assuming the same for ex-ante types as well.
Thus, as far as testing goes, we can proceed as if the observed type r
is the true type a. The intuition here is that even if the values of cross
covariances are contaminated by the sample selection and mixing of distribu-
tions, the equality restrictions between cross covariances remain valid.
-20-6. BROADENING THE DEFINITION OF FAMILY TYPE
In order to carry out our covariance-based tests for each sub-sample
defined by the observed type, we need a sample vsriance-covarisnce matrix of
cross covariances, requiring the sample size be grester than the square of
the number of household-year combinations. Unfortunately, our sample is not
large enough to allow us to strictly adhere to the definition of the observed
type in dividing the sample into sub-samples.We therefore restrict our
attention to the moat popular family types, which are "balanced" families,
families in which the same set of member households including the unique
parent household are continuously in the sample throughout the sample pariod.
Still, sub-samples of "balanced" families are still too small relative
to the number of cross covariances. This difficulty can be largely resolved
if we decide not to use the information on the birth order: for each family,
we take a random permutation of split-offs to re-assign the household index k
(—1,2,..).That this broadens the definition of the type can be seen from
an example provided in Table V. The two families in Panel (i) of the table
are "balanced" because the set of split-offs is the same over time.They
are, however, different types because the composition of the split-offs
differs between the two families. But the number of split-offs is the same,
so they are of the same broader type after the random permutation of split-
offs. For the rest of the paper we use H (the number of ever-present split-
of fs) to index the broader type.Even under this broader definition of the
observed type, there are not sufficiently many families with N >2.We
henceforth focus on sub-samples with N —0,1or 2.
Since the permutation of split-offs is random, the distribution of the
sample observation of type N —2satisfies symmetry:
-21-(2)(2) (2)(2) (6.la) Cov(c1y6) —Cov(cjttyik)for k,t —1,2,
(2)(2) (2)(2) (6.lb) Cov(c60y) —Cov(c0y1)for k,1 —1,2,
(2)(2) (2)(2) (6.lc) Cov(cjkt.yjo) —Cov(c.1y0)for k,t —1,2.
These symmetry restrictions sre displayed in Table V(ii); for any given year
combinations (ta), the 9 covariancea are described by S unique cross coven-
ances. If symaetry is imposed on the cross covanisnce matrix, the random
permutation of split-offs does not affect the test statistics numericslly.
So there is no need to literally take a random permutation of split-of fs in
the first place.Symmetry is a logical consequence of the construction of
broader types, and we will incorporate it in our testing procedure. Table VI
lists the parameters (unique cross coveriances) to be estimated under symmet-
ry. We use for the stacked vector of unique cross covariances, ordered
as indicated in Table VI, for type M —0,1,2.
The same argument we made for the Proposition in section S establishes
that the asintsined hypothesis holds for any M.Thus, the covariance matrix
for k,t —0,..,M and t,s —1,..,T, where is defined as
(H) (H) (H) (6.2) ck —log(C)
-
OktXikt
satisfies the covsriance restrictions in Table IV for a —M.The covariance
restrictions can be essily translated into a set of linear restrictions on
the unique cross covariances
(H) (H) (H) (6.3) 6— ç free parameters.
The appropriste matrix WM for each of the four models of consumption is
displayed in Table VII.
-22-7. ESTIMATION ANDTESTING
So far we have assumed that the ak vector necessary for calculating the
residual consumption c1 in (6.2) is known.This section describes our
two-step procedure for estimation and testing of the covarisnce restrictions
whose first step estimates °kt by regressing the log of consumption and
endowment on household cherscteristics. The second step uses the residual
for consumption and endowment from the first-stage regression to calculate
the cross covariances and tests the restriction (6.3) on the covsriance
matrix. Readers not interested in econometric details can skip the rest of
this section without losing continuity.
LetE*(log(C)Ix) be the population least squares projection of
(H) (H) A(H) (H) (H) (H) A(s)






A(H) (H) It is important to note that cik and cik are not equal because the log
marginal utility (9), which is a component of cI (see (4.4s) for a —N),
can be correlated with This raises two questions.First, do the
covsrisnce restrictions for cIr and y nevertheless hold for and
Second, if so, can we carry out the covariance-bssed test for and
while ignoring the sampling error that arises from the fact that the
population least squares projection has to be estimated from the sample by
-A(H) A(s)
OLS(ordinarylesst squares) to obtain ck and y17 This is sometimes
referred to as the problem of generated regressors.
The answer to the first question is yes. Since the maintained hypothes-
is (4.4) holds for a —Msnd since is a lineer function of x end
y, we have Cov(,) —0.Thus the same set of coverience restricti-
-23-CM) ACM) ons(6.3) holds for the unique elements of Cov(cikt.yit). But
CM) ACM) ACM) ACM) ACM) CM) ACM) —Gov(c.y6).because 'ikt is orthogonal to Xikt and cikG
depends linearly on x. Therefore, (6.3) also holds for the unique elemen-
ts of Cov(,) under the respective models of consumption. Hereafter
CM) . ACM)ACM) we use Sfor the unique elements of Cov(cyff).
If we have data on and 9C,restingthe covariance restriciion
(6.3) is quite straightforward. LetM)be the stacked vector of cross
products 9)• For H —0or 1, the symmetry restriction is absent and
the optimal estimator VM) of unique covariances is simply the sample mean of
)M)becauseCov(,9) —E(IV).Its asymptotic covariance matrix
)M)isconsistently estimated by the sample variance of 1M),For M —2,
let 0 be the selection matrix representing symmetry (6.1) that maps the
stacked vector of covariances into the unique covariances 6C2), A consistent
and asymptotically efficient estimator tC2C of 5C2) and a consistent estimate




wherea and V are, respectively, the sample mean and the sample variance of
)2) Given (M),aCM)), the linear restriction (6.3) on 6)MC can be easily
tested for each H using the fact that the minimum over çCM) of
(7.3)
NCM)(8CM).WMc)M))h[M)J(6)M)WHcCM)),
where N)M) is the number of observations in sub-sample H, is asymptotically
distributed /(q) where q equals the dimension of 6)M) minus the rank of WH.
The answer to the second question we posed above is also yes: estimation
and testing can proceed exactly as described in the previous paragraph while
ignoring the problem of generaied regressors. The proof, which is straight-
forward but tedious, is in Appendix 1.
-24-8. SAMPLE
This section briefly describes the construction of our sseple. The P510
begsn in 1968 with 4,802 original (parent) households, consisting of s sample
representative of the U.S. populstion (2,930 households) and s supplementary
sample of low income households (1,872 households). The P510 has reinter-
viewed not only the parent households but slso new households which arise
when members of the parent households split off to form an independent house-
hold (a split-off). Hence, the P510 provides matched data on parents togeth-
er with at least a subset of their independent children.
The tapes for the 1987 wave contain 36,580 individuals who ever existed
in the survey.13 Our sample construction has two steps. First, we identify
the head, the spouse (if any) and children (including those yet to be born as
of 1968) for each of the 4,802 parent households.There are 24,945 such
individuals; virtually all the rest consists of those who married parent
household members after 1968.Second, for every year we check whether they
are a household head or spouse. If so, they are either in a parent household
or in a split-off household.Since each individual record also contains
information on the household the individual inhabits, we can get information
on the household from the record on the head. This generates, for each year
and for each parent household, a set of households (i.e., a fazsiiy) whose
head or spouse was a member of the parent household.We performed these
steps for the period 1985-87 to produce 20,519 household-year combinations
for 3,070 families.14 (The rest of the 4,802 original households disappeared
from the survey by 1985 and did not re-emerge by 1987.) We choose to focus
"see Survey Research Center (1989), Part 9 of Section 1 for details.
14A complete documentation of the sample along with the SAS programs is avail-
able upon request from the first author at a nominal charge.
-25-on the most recent three yests to msximize the number of split-offa.
From this sample we exclude observations in the supplementary sample of
low income households, because doing so mskes the sample more representative.
As discussed in the next section, the effect of including the low income
sample on our results is small.This reduced the ssmple size to 11,060
observations (household-year combinations) for 1,819 families. We then dtop
119 split-off observations for which 1985 was the first year of existence,
because their reported income for the first year may be for the parent house-
hold from which they split off.This should not bias our results; it only
forces us to focus on a particular type of family. We then delete 27 obser-
vations with top-coded values for relevant consumption and income components.
We also delete 39 observations whose food expenditure (food at home and away
from home, plus the value of food stamps) is zero, and 223 observations whose
food figure was assigned by the Survey Research Center. Although the exclu-
sion of these 262 (—223+39)observations does not materially change our
results, this is nonetheless a sample selection based on consumption, which
may bias our results. Our justification is that these cases are distinguish-
ed because of measurement errors.15 We then delete 196 observations for which
the sum of annual labor income and pension income, which is our measure of
endowment, is 0.Since this is a sample selection based on endowments, it
should not bias our results. This leaves us with a sample of 10,446 house-
hold-year combinations for 1,793 families. Table VIII contains simple stati-
stics for this sample by parent/split-off and by year.
'5There are 4 clear outlying observations whose food expenditure at home is
greater than or equal to $52,000.Inspection of their record led us to
believe that their number is off by one digit, ao we decided to divide their
food expenditure at home by 10.This made very little difference to our
results. For housing consumption, there was no observations with zero consu-
mption or obvious extreme values.
-26-9. RESULTS
Although there is no technical difficulty in testing the covarisnce
restrictions jointly, we do the test for food snd housing consumption sepa-
rately. The reeson is thst the unique cross covarisnces of endowments with
both food end housing consumption sre too numerous for some sub-samples.
Appendix 2 provides the definition of the vsriables used in analysis.In
particular, endowment is the sum of labor income, pension income, end social
security benefits. Asset income is not a good measure of endowment because
it reflects past savings behavior, which csn be related to a permanent
component of the taste shifter.The vector of household characteristics
includes leisure and health dummies, for head and spouse.
We created two samples of balanced families from the sample of 10,446
household-year combinations described in section 8. The difference between
the two samples lies in the set of observations (household-year combinati-
ons) to be deleted before balanced families are extracted: the first sample
excludes no observations, while the second sample excludes split-off obser-
vations whose head in the 1984 survey expected to receive no bequests.'6 We
wish to examine this second sample because family members will not be effec-
tively linked by altruism if the non-negativity constraint on bequests is
binding.'7 Since whether the constraint binds or not depends on the distri-
bution of endowments within the family, our Proposition in section 5 guaran-
'6The 1984 wave of the PSID contains information on expected amount of beques-
ts.Its tape code is V10950.Since split-offs that did not exist in 1984
were already excluded from the sample (see section 8), this variable in the
split-off's record is for that split-off, not for its parent household.
'7We are thus excluding in the second sample those split-offs whose expected
bequests are zero but who are nevertheless altruistically linked through
other form of transfers. This is not a problem; what is important is that
those in the sample are altruistically linked under altruism, and those with
positive expected bequests are certainly so.
-27-tees that the covariance restrictions hold for this sample as well. Table
IX gives en enumeration of balanced families by number of aplit-offs (11).
Since about 80% of split-offs expect to receive no bequests, balanced fami-
lies with two or more split-offs in the second sample are scarce. Since the
sample size must be sufficiently greater than the number of unique cross
covariances (which equals 5xT2 —45for 14 2) for the Chi-squared statistic
(7.3) to be reliably calculated, we are forced to restrict the application
of our two-step procedure to sub-samples H —0,1,2for the first sample end
14 —0,1for the second sample.'°
Panel (i) of Table X reports our results from the first sample.The
lower half of the panel displays the Cbi-squared statistics, derived from
the upper panel, appropriate for sequential testing of the four partially
nested hypotheses. It only reports the statistics aggregated over sub-
samples, which are also Chi-squared.The Chi-square statistics aggregated
over family types point to a rejection of all four models of consumption.
Only on sub-sample H —1for food, neither model (c) (complete markets) nor
(d) (family risk-sharing) can be rejected, which suggests that our food data
are noisier than data on housing. One possible reason for the relatively
weak evidence from food consumption against complete markets end family
risk-sharing is that its measurement error is not persistent so that the
signal-to-noise ratio gets very saall in first differences.'9
Panel (ii) of Table X shows results from the second sample of balanced
'8The first-stage regression of log consumption end endowment on household
characteristics is for each (k,t) and for each H. However, by symmetry
(6.1), split-offs with different birth order can be pooled in the first-
stage regression.
t9As made clear in section 2 (see (2.3) end (2.4)), the covariance restricti-
ons implied by complete markets and family risk-sharing reduce to restricti-
ons on first differences in consumption.
-28-families, which excludes split-offs with zero expected bequests. Again, the
results for food are weak for complete markets and family risk-sharing, but
if date on housing are to receive more weights, the evidence as a whole is
that all the four models can be rejected.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we perturbed the two
samples in the following ways: (i) drop leisure from the vector of household
characteristics; (ii) conduct the test in levels rather than in logs; (iii)
delete observations whose food consumption or endowment is leas than $520 in
1987 dollars before extracting balanced samples; (iv) delete split-offs
inhabited by married daughters of parent households; and (v) include the low
income supplementary sample.Overall, our tesulta are robust to these
perturbations.The only notable exceptions are the following. The Chi-
squared statistic for models (c) and (d) based on food is sensitive but only
slightly so; the overall p-value for model (d) for food in the basic sample
is slightly above 5% when the low income sample is included. There are only
three instances where the overall p-value based on housing is above 1% for
any model, and they occur in the second sample: if married daughters are
excluded, the p-value for model (b) (altruism) is about 6% and the p for
model (d) is about 1%; if the low income sample is included, the p for model
(d) is about 9%.
Our reading of the evidence can be summarized as follows. First,
clearly, complete markets fails empirically. Its failure is obscured by the
low signal-to-noise ratio for food changes and the additional noise from the
low income sample.Second, altruism may hold but it is operative only for
families for which the non-negativity constraint on intergenerational trans-
fers is apparently not binding.
-29-APPENDIX 1: PROOF OF THE CLAIMINTHE END OF SECTION 7
We prove that the problem of generated regressors does not arise in the
context of our covariance-besed test. Since the proof can he easily adapted
to include symmetry (6.1), we focus on the case with N —0or I. To simplify
the notation, we drop the superscript "(N)" in the following proof.
Let kt'kt be the coefficients in the (population) least square
projection of (log(Cikt). 'ikt on xfk and let kt'kt be their OLS
counterparts. As in the text, is the stacked vector of cross products
calculated from ikt —b0g(Cf) end its — and (*,A)
is the sample mean and the sample variance matrix of . Wewrite
for the OLS counterpart of (i,ikt9ikttA) In parti-
cular, is the sample variance of We wish to show thathas the same
asymptotic distribution and that A and A converge in probability to the same
limit. The latter is immediate from the fact that the OLSestimator
ktikt) is consistent for (PktlktL
To evaluate the asymptotic distribution of Z,wenote that the typical
element of Vc(-Z) is
A A — —





Clearly, the last term converges to 0 in probability. The first two terms on
the right hand side also converge to 0, because the probability limits of the
bracketed terms are zero by construction of ikt end and ktkt
and /iGk--vk) are bounded in probability.
-30-APPENDIX 2: MAPPING OP THE PSID CODES TO VARIABLES IN THE ARALYSIS
This appendix provides an explicit mapping from the PSID tape codes (see
Survey Research Center (1989) for the definition of the coded variables) to
the variables used in this study.
1. Consumption and Endowments
The following is our definition of food (FOOD), housing consumption




Table Al provides themapping from the PSID tape codes to the components of
food,housing, arid endowments.The labor income (EARNH, EARNW) available
fromthe PSID includes a labor component of business income imputed by the
Survey Research Center.
2, Household Characteristics: Categorical Variables
Table A2 provides the mapping along with the number of dummies created
from each categorical variable. The dummies relating to the spouse are zero
ifthespouse does not exist.
3. Household Characteristics: Numerical Variables
The first three variables in Table A3 along with their squares are also
included in the vector of household characteristics. To calculate leisure,
we assume that time endowment is 24 hours a day. The log of leisure and its
square are included in the vector of characteristica.If the head is not
married, the apouae'a leisure is zero.





FDEXHO food at home 11375 12774 13876
FDEXRE food away from home 11377 12776 13878
FDSPMO value of food stamps last month11373 12772 13874
HOUSEV value of house 11125 12524
RENT annual rent 11133 12532 13732
IRENT rental value of free housing 11135 12534 13734
EARNH labor income of head 12372 13624 14671
EARNW labor income of spouse 11404 12803 13905
SSBHW social security benefits 11433 12832+1285313934+13955
PENVET veteran's pension for head 11436 12835 13937
PENNVT other pension income for head 11438 12837 13939
TABLE A2: CATEGORICAL VARIABLES OF HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
#dummies PSID tape code
description created 1985 1986 1987
head's sex 1 11607 13012 14115
head's race 2 11938 13565 14612
head's marital status 1 12426 13665 14712
head's health condition 4 11991 13417 14513
spouse's health condition 4 12344 13452 14524
TABLE A3: NUMERICAL VARIABLES OF HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
PSID tape code
description 1985 1986 1987
head's age 11606 13011 14114
number of adults in the household 11605 13010 14113
number of people under age 18 11609 13014 14117
head's annual hours worked 11146 12545 13745
spouse's annual hours worked 11258 12657 13809
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FACTORSTRUCTURE OF LOG MARGINAL UTILITY OF INCOME
Model ek
(a)completemarketswithaltruism: A. + +
(b)altruism: A1 +Wk +
(c)completeisarkets:
Aik + Pt
(d)family risk-sharing: Aik + pit






(1) Representation of Restrictions on Coveriances based on Factors
(a)(a) Model Cov(c1y1)
(a)
(a)complete markets with altruism: Cov(4°
(a) (a)(a) (b)altruism: Cov(A),y1) +COV(Pir''ita
(a) (c)complete markets: Cov(Ay1)
(a) (a)(a)
(d) family risk-sharing: Cov(4,y15) +Cov(Pi
(ii) Equivalent Representation of Restrictions besed on Equalities
Model Equality Restrictions
(a) complete markets with eltruiam: Cov(c (a) (a)(a) —Cov(cy)
for all (k,t),(m,v),(ts)Ca.
(b) altruism: Cov(c° (a) (a) (a) —Cov(cjyj15)
for all (k,m,t,ta) such that
(k,t) (m,t) (t,a)€a.
(c) complete markets: Cov(c° (a) (a) (a)
ikt''its —Cov(c.y1)
for all (k1,tv,a) such that
(k,t) (k,v) (t,a)€a.
(a)(a)
(d) family risk-sharing: Cov(c° (a)
—Cov(c(a))C
(a)(a) (c.y1)
for all (k,m,t,t,v,a) such that
(k,t) (k,v) (m,t) (mv) (t,a)ea.
-36-TABLE V
BROADENINGTHE FAMILY TYPE
(i)Birth Order and the Type
(ii) Symmetry Reduces the Number of Unique Covariances



























































































































WI for model (d) has 2T2+4T columns, but only (2T2+2T) of them are linearly
independent, Similarly, WM for N 2 for model (d) has 2T2+ST columns, hut
only 212+31 of them are linearly independent.
-38-TABLE VIII
SIMPLESTATISTICS FOR PARENT HOUSEHOLDS AND SPLIT-OFFS BY YEAR
1985 Mean Std Dcv MeanStd Dcv
parents(N —1728)split-offs(N —1637)
MARRIED 1 if married 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.46
RACE head's age 58.66 13.91 31.17 5.98
FSZ family size 2.43 1.28 3.01 1.46
NKID #people under lB 0.45 0.88 1.24 1.19
FOOD food consumption 4362.2 2952.6 4250.0 2137.7
ROUSE housing consumption 5805.6 4750.7 5137.7 4144.7
1' endowment 27051.1 25268.3 30129.8 23385.0
INCOME household income 35835.5 33912.3 33470.0 25220.1
1986
MARRIED 1 if married
parents(N —1712)split-offs(N —1824)
0.65 0.48 0.70 0.46
RACE head's age 59.39 13.70 31.31 6.33
FSZ family size 2.38 1.26 2.95 1.45
NKID #people under 18 0.41 0.82 1.18 1.20
FOOD food consumption 4230.4 2600.9 4182.7 2141.9
ROUSE housing consumption 5812.8 4931.6 5138.4 4507.9
Y endowment 26992.9 26580.1 30150.2 23900.6
INCOME household income 35721.1 31994.3 33271.7 25459.9
1987
MARRIED 1 if married
parents(N —1649) spllt-offa(N —1896)
0.64 0.48 0.70 0.46
RACE head's age 59.80 13.44 31.90 6.48
FSZ family size 2.35 1.23 2.99 1.45
NKID #people under 18 0.38 0.79 1.21 1.20
FOOD food consumption 4071.3 2461.4 4229.6 2153.3
ROUSE housing conaumption 6068.3 5481.3 5437.9 5U95.2
Y endowment 28038.9 32402.3 31386.9 22931.4
INCOME household income 36935.1 38492.5 34887.9 24946.6
Note: Consumption, endowment and income are in 1987 dollars. See Appendix 2
for the definition of FOOD, ROUSE and Y. INCOMEis household pretax income.
TABLEIX
ENUMERATIONOFBALANCED FAMILIES BY NUMBER OF SPLIT-OFFS
Description of the sample
Number of split-offs(M)
0 1 2 3 4 5+ total
basic sample 643192121671711 1,051
no split-offswithzerobequests 1,06616227 2 2 0 1,259
.j9.TABLE X
CHI-SQUARETESTS OFTHE FOUR MODELS OF CONSUMPTION
Panel (i): Basic Sample
food housing
subsample #fsmilies d.f. x2 p-velue x2p-value
Model (a): Complete Markets with Altruism
H —0 643 6 12.0 0.0612 24.0 0.0005
H —1 192 30 68.8 0.0001 84.6 0.0000
H —2 121 39 227.4 0.0000 217.4 0.0000
total: 956 75 308.2 0.0000 326.0 0.0000
Model (b): Altruism
H —0 643 0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
H —1 192 18 46.6 0.0002 56.2 0.0000
H —2 121 27 136.5 0.0000 181.6 0.0000
total: 956 45 183.1 0.0000 237.8 0.0000
Model (c): Complete Merkets
H —0 643 6 12.0 0.0612 24.0 0.0005
M —1 192 24 32.0 0.1266 61.7 0.0000
H —2 121 30 113.0 0.0000 140.0 0.0000
total: 956 60 157.0 0.0000 225.7 0.0000
Model (d): Family Risk-sharing
H —0 643 0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
H —1 192 12 18.8 0.0926 34.7 0.0005
H —2 121 18 61.5 0.0000 121.2 0.0000
total: 956 30 80.4 0.0000 155.9 0.0000
Chi-squere Statistics for Sequential Testing
food housing
null maintained
hypothesis hypothesis d.f. x2 p-value x2p-value
Model (b)model (d) 15 102.7 0.0000 81.9 0.0000
Model (c)model (d) 30 76.7 0.0000 69.8 0.0001
Model (a)model (b) 30 125.1 0.0000 88.2 0.0000
Model (a)model (c) 15 151.2 0.0000 100.2 0.0000
-40-TABLE X
CR1-SQUARETESTS OF THEFOUR MODELS OF CONSUMPTION
Panel(ii):No Split-offs with Zero Expected Bequests
food h
subsample #fainiliesd.f. x2p-value x2
ousing
p-value
Model (a): Complete Markets with Altruism
M —0 1066 6 11.50.0736 43.00.0000
M —1 162 30 68.0 0.0001 89.1 0.0000
total: 1228 36 79.5 0.0000 132.2 0.0000
Model (b): Altruism
M —0 1066 0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
M —1 162 18 31.1 0.0282 49.7 0.0001
total: 1228 18 31.1 0.0282 49.7 0.0001
Model (C):CompleteMarkets
M —0 1066 6 11.5 0.0736 43.0 0.0000
M —1 162 24 29.9 0.1869 59.0 0.0001
total: 1228 30 41.5 0.0796 102.0 0.0000
Model (d): Family Risk-sharing
M —0 1066 0 0.0 1.0000 0.0 1.0000
M —1 162 12 4.2 0.9793 29.5 0.0034
total: 1228 12 4.2 0.9793 29.5 0.0034
CM-square Statistics for Sequential Testing
food housing
null maintained
hypothesis hypothesis d.f. x2p-value x2 p-value
Model (b)model Cd) 6 26.9 0.0002 20.2 0.0025
Model (c)model (d) 18 37.2 0.0049 72.5 0.0000
Model (a)model (b) 18 48.4 0.0001 82.5 0.0000


























FIGURE 2A - Food and Endowment
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FIGURE 2A - Food and Endowment











FIGURE 2B - Housing and Endowment
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FIGURE 2B - Housing and Endowment
(iii) Differences in time Averages
log endowmentFIGURE 3
(1,2)
a/
(1)
(3,4)
(3N\(5)